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Abstract
Deep models are commonly vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples. In this paper, we pro-
pose the first algorithm for effectively gen-
erating both positive and negative adversarial
examples for paraphrase identification. We
first sample an original sentence pair from the
dataset and then adversarially replace some
word pairs with difficult common words. We
take multiple steps and use beam search to
find a modification that makes the target model
fail, and thereby obtain an adversarial exam-
ple. The word replacement is also constrained
by heuristic rules and a language model, to
preserve the label and language quality dur-
ing modification. Experiments show that the
performance of the target models has a se-
vere drop on our adversarially modified exam-
ples.Meanwhile, human annotators are much
less affected, and the generated sentences re-
tain a good language quality. We also show
that adversarial training with generated adver-
sarial examples can improve model robust-
ness, while previous work provides little im-
provement on our adversarial examples.
1 Introduction
Paraphrase identification is to determine whether a
pair of sentences have the same meaning (Socher
et al., 2011). It is important for applications such
as duplicate post matching on social media (Iyer
et al., 2017), plagiarism detection (Clough, 2000),
and automatic evaluation for machine translation
(Russo-Lassner et al., 2005) or text summarization
(Zhou et al., 2006).
Paraphrase identification can be viewed as a
sentence matching problem. Many deep models
have been proposed for this task and their perfor-
mance has been greatly advanced on benchmark
datasets (Wang et al., 2017; Gong et al., 2017;
∗ Work in progress.
Devlin et al., 2018). However, previous research
shows that deep models are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow
et al., 2014) which are particularly constructed to
make models fail. Adversarial examples are of
high value for revealing the weakness and robust-
ness issues of models, and they can further im-
prove robustness and security.
In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm
to generate adversarial examples for paraphrase
identification. To generate an adversarial example
consisting of a sentence pair, we first sample an
original sentence pair from the dataset, and then
adversarially replace some word pairs with diffi-
cult common words respectively. Here a word pair
consists of two words from the two sentences re-
spectively. And common words stand for words
that appear in both sentences. Difficult com-
mon words are substitution words in word replace-
ment, and they are adversarially selected such that
the example becomes harder for the model. The
model is likely to be distracted by such words and
fail to judge the similarity or difference in the un-
modified context, thereby making a wrong predic-
tion.
Our algorithm is motivated by two observations.
First, for a sentence pair with a label positive
(the two sentences are paraphrases and vice versa),
when some pairs of common words are replaced
with difficult common words respectively, models
can be fooled to predict an incorrect label nega-
tive. As the first example in Figure 1 shows, we
may replace two common word pairs, “purpose”
and “life”, with another common words “mea-
sure” and “value” respectively. The new sentence
pair remains positive but fools the target model
to predict negative. Some words are more diffi-
cult for the model, and when such words appear in
the example, the model can fail to combine them
with the unmodified context and judge the simi-
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(P) What is ultimate purpose of life?
(Q) What is the purpose of life , if not money?
(P’) What is ultimate measure of value?
(Q’) What is the measure of value , if not money?
Label Positive
Output Positive→ Negative
(P) How can I get my Gmail account back ?
(Q) What is the best school management software ?
(P’) How can I get my credit score back ?
(Q’) What is the best credit score software ?
Label Negative
Output Negative→ Positive
Figure 1: Two examples with labels positive and nega-
tive respectively, originally from Quora Question Pairs
(QQP) (Iyer et al., 2017). “(P)” and “(Q)” are origi-
nal sentences while “(P’)” and “(Q’)” are adversarially
modified ones. Modified words are highlighted in bold.
“Output” indicates the output change given by target
model BERT (Devlin et al., 2018).
larity of the sentence pair. Second, for a nega-
tive sentence pair, when some word pairs, not nec-
essarily common words, are replaced with com-
mon words, models can be fooled to predict pos-
itive. For the second example in Figure 1, we
can replace “Gmail” and “school” with a common
word “credit”, and replace “account” and “man-
agement” with “score”. The negative new example
fools the target model to predict positive, since the
model is distracted by the common words while
ignoring the difference in the unmodified context.
Following these observations, we focus on ro-
bustness issues about capturing semantic similar-
ity or difference in the unmodified part when dis-
tracted by difficult common words in the modi-
fied part. We try to modify an original example
with multiple steps. In each step, we replace a
pair of words together from the two sentences re-
spectively with an adversarially selected common
word. To preserve the label and language qual-
ity, we impose a few heuristic constraints on re-
placeable positions, and apply a language model
to generate substitution words compatible with the
context. We aim to find a word replacement solu-
tion that maximizes the model loss and makes the
model fail, using beam search.
We mainly make the following contributions:
• We propose an algorithm for generating ad-
versarial examples for paraphrase identifica-
tion. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first algorithm for effectively generating
both positive and negative adversarial exam-
ples for this task. Our adversarial examples
are also substantially different from those in
previous work.
• We reveal a robustness issues in paraphrase
identification models. Experiments show that
the target models have a severe performance
drop on the adversarial examples, while hu-
man annotators are much less affected and
most modified sentences retain a good lan-
guage quality.
• Adversarial training with our adversarial ex-
amples can mitigate the robustness issue,
while models adversarially trained with ad-
versarial examples by previous work still suf-
fer from this issue.
2 Related Work
2.1 Deep Paraphrase Identification
Recently, deep models for sentence matching and
paraphrase identification have achieved great ad-
vancements on benchmark datasets. Some encode
each sentence independently and apply a classi-
fier on the encoded embeddings (Bowman et al.,
2015; Yang et al., 2015; Conneau et al., 2017).
Some make strong interactions between two sen-
tences by jointly encoding and matching sentences
(Wang et al., 2017; Duan et al., 2018; Kim et al.,
2018) or hierarchically extracting matching fea-
tures from the interaction space of the sentence
pair (Hu et al., 2014; Pang et al., 2016; Gong et al.,
2017). Notably, BERT pre-trained on large-scale
corpora achieved even better results (Devlin et al.,
2018). In this paper, we study the robustness of
typical deep models for paraphrase identification.
2.2 Adversarial Examples in NLP
Adversarial examples have been a popular topic
in machine learning and also NLP. We focus
on those that can possibly be applied to para-
phrase identification. Behjati et al. (2019); Wal-
lace et al. (2019) studied on universal adversar-
ial perturbation or triggers which, however, ap-
peared to be semantically meaningless and the lan-
guage quality was ignored. Besides, many meth-
ods aimed to generate adversarial examples by
adding semantic-preserving perturbations to in-
put sentences. Beˇlohla´vek et al. (2018) added
perturbations to word embeddings. Samanta and
Mehta (2017); Ebrahimi et al. (2018); Kuleshov
et al. (2018); Alzantot et al. (2018); Hsieh et al.
(2019); Jin et al. (2019); Ren et al. (2019); Zhang
et al. (2019a) employed several character-level or
word-level manipulations. Iyyer et al. (2018) used
syntactically controlled paraphrasing, and Ribeiro
et al. (2018) paraphrased sentences with extracted
rules. However, for tasks including paraphrase
identification, adversarial examples can be seman-
tically different from original sentences, and more
adversarial examples can be generated.
For text entailment which is also a sentence
matching problem, Minervini and Riedel (2018)
considered logical rules of sentence relations but
can only generate unlabeled adversarial examples.
Glockner et al. (2018) used single word replace-
ment with lexical knowledge. Notably, to the best
of our knowledge, Zhang et al. (2019b) which
used word swapping and back translation is the
only previous work for paraphrase identification,
except for Yang et al. (2019) which is the cross-
lingual version of Zhang et al. (2019b).
Glockner et al. (2018) and Zhang et al. (2019b)
both generated a sentence pair by modifying a sin-
gle original sentence and combined both original
and modified sentences to form a pair. Among
them, back translation still aimed to produce se-
mantically equivalent sentences; two sentences
constructed by the others have exactly the same
unmodified parts which were the major parts but
required little matching. In contrast, we gener-
ate a labeled adversarial example by modifying a
pair of original sentences together. The unmod-
ified parts of the two sentences are lexically di-
verse to reveal the robustness issue about match-
ing these parts when distracted by the modified
part. Thereby we generate substantially different
adversarial examples and study a new robustness
issue. Moreover, we find that previous methods
have difficulty generating either positive or neg-
ative adversarial examples for paraphrase identi-
fication, while our method can effective generate
both positive and negative ones.
3 Methodology
3.1 Task Definition
Paraphrase identification can be formulated as fol-
lows: given two sentences P = p1p2 · · · pn and
Q = q1q2 · · · qm, the goal is to predict whether P
and Q are paraphrases of each other, by estimating
a probability distribution
P(y|P,Q) (1)
where y ∈ Y = {positive, negative}. For
each label y, the model outputs a score [Z(P,Q)]y
which is the predicted probability of this label. We
aim to make the target model fail on our adversar-
ially modified example (Pˆ , Qˆ):
P(y|Pˆ , Qˆ) > P(y|Pˆ , Qˆ) (2)
where y indicates the gold label and y is the wrong
label opposite to the gold one.
3.2 Algorithm Framework
We generate an adversarial example by firstly sam-
pling an original example from the dataset and
then constructing adversarial modification. We
use beam search and take multiple steps to modify
the example, until the target model fails or the step
number limit is reached. In each step, we modify
the sentences by replacing a word pair with a dif-
ficult common word. We identify replaceable po-
sition pairs and candidate substitution words for
those positions respectively. We evaluate differ-
ent options according to the target model loss they
raise, and we retainB best options after each stage
of each step during beam search. Finally, the ad-
versarially modified example is returned.
3.3 Original Example Sampling
To sample an original example from the dataset for
subsequent adversarial modification, we consider
two cases where the label is negative and posi-
tive respectively. For the negative case, we sample
two different sentence pairs (P1, Q1) and (P2, Q2)
from the original data, and then form a negative
example (P1, Q2, negative) with sentences from
two sentence pairs respectively. We also limit the
length difference ||P1| − |Q2|| and resample un-
til the limit is met, since sentence pairs with large
length difference inherently tend to be negative
and are too easy for models. Two sentences sam-
pled from different examples tend to have less in
common originally, which can help better preserve
the label during adversarial modification, and this
also makes it more challenging to make the target
model fail. On the other hand, positive examples
cannot be sampled in this way and thus we simply
sample one example with a label positive from the
dataset, namely, (P,Q, positive).
3.4 Replaceable Position Pairs
We replace a word pair at each step during adver-
sarial modification. We set heuristic rules on re-
placeable position pairs to preserve the label and
Figure 2: Two examples of identifying replaceable po-
sition pairs that are linked with red lines. In the neg-
ative example, POS tags of non-stopwords obtained
using Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) (Bird et al.,
2009) are shown below the corresponding words.
language quality. First of all, we do not replace
stopwords. We also require a pair of replaceable
words to be both nouns, both verbs, or both ad-
jectives, according to Part-of-Speech (POS) tags.
For a positive example, we further require the two
words to be exactly the same.
Figure 2 shows two examples of identifying re-
placeable positions. For the first example (posi-
tive), only common words “purpose” and “life”
can be replaced. And since they are replaced si-
multaneously with another common words, the
modified sentences are likely to talk about another
same thing, e.g. changing from “purpose of life”
to “measure of value”, and thereby the new sen-
tences tend to remain positive. As for the sec-
ond example (negative), each noun in the first sen-
tence, “Gmail” and “account”, can form replace-
able word pairs with each noun in the second sen-
tence, “school”, “management” and “software”.
The irreplaceable part determines that the modi-
fied sentences are “How can I get · · · back ? ”
and “What is the best · · · ?” respectively. Sen-
tences based on these two templates are likely to
discuss about different things or different aspects,
even when filled with common words, and thus
they are likely to remain negative. In this way, the
labels can be preserved in most cases.
3.5 Candidate Substitution Word Generation
For a pair of replaceable positions, we generate
candidate substitution words that can replace the
current words on those positions. For language
quality, substitution words should be compatible
with the context. Therefore, we apply a BERT
language model (Devlin et al., 2018). Specif-
ically, when some words in a text are masked,
the BERT masked language model can predict the
masked words based on the context. For a sen-
tence x1x2 · · ·xl where the k-th word is masked,
the language model gives the following probabil-
ity distribution:
P(xk|x1...k−1, xk−1...l). (3)
Thereby, to replace word pi and qj from the two
sentences respectively, we mask pi and qj and
present each sentence to the language model. We
aim to replace pi and qj with a common word w
which can be regarded as the masked word to be
predicted. We obtain a joint probability distribu-
tion as follows:
P(w|p1...i−1, pi+1...n, q1...j−1, qj+1...m)
=P(w|p1...i−1, pi+1...n) · P(w|q1...j−1, qj+1...m).
(4)
We rank all the words in the vocabulary of the tar-
get model and choose top K words with largest
probabilities, as the candidate substitution words
for the corresponding positions.
3.6 Finding Adversarial Examples
Once the replaceable positions and candidate sub-
stitution words can be determined, we use beam
search with beam size B to find optimal adversar-
ial modification in multiple steps. At step t, we
have two stages to determine replaceable positions
and the corresponding substitution words respec-
tively, based on the two-stage framework by Yang
et al. (2018).
To determine the best replaceable positions, we
enumerate all possible position pairs and obtain a
set of candidate intermediate examples, C(t)pos, by
replacing words on each position pair with a spe-
cial token [PAD] respectively. We then query the
target model with examples in C(t)pos to obtain the
model output. We take top B examples that max-
imize the output score of the opposite label y (we
define this operation as arg topB), obtaining a set
of intermediate examples {(Pˆ (t,k)pos , Qˆ(t,k)pos )}Bk=1, as
follows:
{(Pˆ (t,k)pos , Qˆ(t,k)pos )}Bk=1 = arg topB
(Pˆ ,Qˆ)∈C(t)pos
[Z(Pˆ , Qˆ)]y.
(5)
We then determine difficult common words to
replace the [PAD] placeholders. For each example
in {(Pˆ (t,k)pos , Qˆ(t,k)pos )}Bk=1, we enumerate all words
in the candidate substitution word set of positions
with [PAD]. We obtain a set of candidate exam-
ples,C(t), by replacing [PAD] with each candidate
substitution word respectively. We use arg topB
again and obtain a set of modified example after
step t:
{(Pˆ (t,k), Qˆ(t,k))}Bk=1 = arg topB
(Pˆ ,Qˆ)∈C(t)
[Z(Pˆ , Qˆ)]y.
(6)
After t steps, for (Pˆ (t,1), Qˆ(t,1)), if the label
predicted by the target model is already y, i.e.
[Z(Pˆ (t,1), Qˆ(t,1))]y > [Z(Pˆ
(t,1), Qˆ(t,1))]y, this ex-
ample is an adversarial example and thus we finish
the modification process. Otherwise, we continue
taking another step, until the step number limit S
is reached. Finally, (Pˆ (t,1), Qˆ(t,1)) is returned as
the adversarially modified example.
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets
We adopt the following datasets:
• QQP (Iyer et al., 2017): The Quora Ques-
tion Pairs (QQP) consists of question pairs.
We use the same partition as (Wang et al.,
2017), with 384,348/10,000/10,000 pairs in
the training/development/test set.
• MRPC (Dolan and Brockett, 2005): The Mi-
crosoft Research Paraphrase Corpus consists
of sentence pairs collected from online news
with 4,076/1,725 pairs in the training/test set.
Each sentence pair is annotated with a label indi-
cating whether the two sentences are paraphrases.
4.2 Target Models
We adopt the following typical deep models for
paraphrase identification as the target models:
• BiMPM (Wang et al., 2017), the Bilateral
Multi-Perspective Matching model, matches
two sentences on all combinations of time
stamps from multiple perspectives, with BiL-
STM layers to encode the sentences and ag-
gregate matching results.
• DIIN (Gong et al., 2017), the Densely Inter-
active Inference Network, creates a word-by-
word interaction matrix by computing simi-
larities on sentence representations encoded
by a highway network and self-attention, and
then adopts DenseNet (Huang et al., 2017) to
extract interaction features for matching.
• BERT (Devlin et al., 2018), the Bidirectional
Encoder Representations from Transformers,
is pre-trained on large-scale corpora, and then
fine-tuned on this task. The matching result
is obtained by applying a classifier on the en-
coded hidden states of the two sentences. We
use BERTbase in this work.
4.3 Implementation Details
We adopt existing open source codes for BiMPM1,
DIIN2 and BERT3. For QQP, the step number limit
S is set to 5; the number of candidate substitution
words generated using the language model K and
the beam size B are both set to 25. S, K and B
are doubled for MRPC where sentences are gener-
ally longer. The length difference between nega-
tive sentence pairs is limited to at most 3.
4.4 Main Results
We train each target model on the original train-
ing dataset (so these models are normally trained),
and then generate adversarial examples. For each
dataset, we sample 1,000 original examples with
balanced labels from the test set, and adversari-
ally modify them for each target model. We evalu-
ate the accuracies of target models on the modified
examples and compare these accuracies with those
on the original examples. The accuracy on mod-
ified examples corresponds to the success rate of
finding adversarial examples and they sum up to
1. Table 1 presents the results, and in this section
we focus on rows with “Normal” for field “Train-
ing”.
The target models have high overall accuracies
on the original examples, especially on the sam-
pled ones since we form a negative original exam-
ple with independently sampled sentences. The
models have relatively lower accuracies on the
negative examples in the full original test set of
MRPC because MRPC is relatively small while
the two labels are imbalanced in the original data
(3,900 positive examples and 1,901 negative ex-
amples). We thus generate adversarial examples
with balanced labels instead of following the orig-
inal distribution.
After adversarial modification, the performance
of the original target models drops dramatically
(e.g. the overall accuracy of BERT on QQP drops
1https://github.com/zhiguowang/BiMPM
2https://github.com/YichenGong/Densely-Interactive-
Inference-Network
3https://github.com/huggingface/transformers
Dataset Target Model Training Original full Original sampled AdversarialPos Neg All Pos Neg All Pos Neg All
QQP
BiMPM
Normal
88.5 87.8 88.1 88.0 99.4 93.7 14.4 7.8 11.1
DIIN 91.5 85.9 88.7 89.6 99.6 94.6 31.0 8.2 19.6
BERT 90.7 91.3 91.0 89.6 99.6 94.6 33.4 14.8 24.1
BERT TextFooler 90.9 89.9 90.3 90.6 99.6 95.1 35.8 8.4 22.1PAWS 87.9 91.4 89.7 88.8 99.4 94.1 33.0 18.2 25.6
BiMPM
Ours
89.6 88.0 88.9 89.4 99.8 94.6 15.0 27.8 21.4
DIIN 82.1 91.7 86.9 81.2 99.8 90.5 35.0 72.2 53.6
BERT 87.6 92.5 90.1 86.8 99.8 93.3 53.0 79.0 66.0
MRPC
BiMPM
Normal
90.2 40.0 73.4 87.2 97.4 92.3 3.2 0.2 1.7
DIIN 89.9 49.5 76.3 90.4 100.0 95.2 48.2 0.4 24.3
BERT 93.2 66.4 84.2 94.0 100.0 97.0 45.6 2.0 23.8
BERT TextFooler 89.5 71.6 83.5 88.4 99.6 94.0 37.4 0.4 18.9
BiMPM
Ours
96.8 26.3 73.2 95.6 100.0 97.8 73.2 0.6 36.9
DIIN 85.8 58.0 76.5 82.8 100.0 91.4 59.8 67.6 63.7
BERT 95.3 55.2 81.9 95.0 100.0 97.5 81.0 93.0 87.0
Table 1: Accuracies (%) of target models on QQP and MRPC respectively, evaluated on both original and our
adversarial examples. “Original full” indicates the full original test set, “Original sampled” indicates the sampled
original examples before adversarial modification, and “Adversarial” indicates examples adversarially modified by
our algorithm. “Pos” and “Neg” are short for “Positive” and “Negative” respectively. For training, “TextFooler”,
“PAWS” and “Ours” indicate that the models are adversarially trained with adversarial examples by previous work
and our algorithm respectively. We highlight the performance drop of normally trained models on adversarially
modified examples and also the performance improvement after our adversarial training in bold.
from 94.6% to 24.1%), revealing that the target
models are vulnerable to our adversarial exam-
ples. Particularly, even though our generation is
constrained by a BERT language model, BERT
for paraphrase identification is still vulnerable to
our adversarial examples. These results demon-
strate the effectiveness of our algorithm for gener-
ating adversarial examples and revealing the corre-
sponding robustness issue. Moreover, we present
some generated adversarial examples in the ap-
pendix.
We notice that normally trained models are
more vulnerable to negative adversarial examples,
partly because there are generally more replace-
able positions compared to the positive case. Nev-
ertheless, the results of the positive case are also
sufficiently strong to reveal the robustness issue.
4.5 Manual Evaluation
Dataset Metric Original Adversarial
QQP
Accuracy - Positive 86% 72%
Accuracy - Negative 98% 80%
Accuracy - All 92% 76%
Grammaticality 2.48 2.15
MRPC
Accuracy - Positive 90% 94%
Accuracy - Negative 100% 82%
Accuracy - All 95% 88%
Grammaticality 2.40 2.19
Table 2: Manual evaluation results, including human
performance on original and adversarial examples re-
spectively, and grammaticality ratings.
To verify the validity of our adversarial examples,
we further perform a manual evaluation. For each
dataset, using BERT as the target model, we ran-
domly sample 100 generated adversarial examples
with balanced labels. We blend these adversarial
examples with the corresponding original exam-
ples, and present each example to three workers
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We ask the workers
to label the examples and also rate the grammati-
cality of the sentences with a scale of 1/2/3 (3 for
no grammar error, 2 for minor errors, and 1 for
vital errors). We integrate annotations from dif-
ferent workers with majority voting for labels and
averaging for grammaticality.
Table 2 shows the results. Unlike target models
whose performance drops dramatically on adver-
sarial examples, human annotators retain high ac-
curacies with a much smaller drop, while the ac-
curacies of the target models are 0 on these ex-
amples. This demonstrates that the labels of most
adversarial examples are successfully preserved.
Results also show that the grammaticality differ-
ence between the original examples and adversar-
ial examples is also small, suggesting that most ad-
versarial examples retain a good language quality.
These results verify the validity of our adversarial
examples.
4.6 Adversarial Training
Adversarial training can often improve model
robustness (Minervini and Riedel, 2018; Zhang
et al., 2019b). We also fine-tune the target models
using adversarial training. At each training step,
we train the model with a batch of original ex-
amples along with our adversarial examples with
balanced labels. Adversarial examples account for
around 10% in a batch. During training, we gen-
erate adversarial examples with the current model
as the target and update the model parameters iter-
atively. The beam size for generation is set to 1 to
reduce the computation cost, since the generation
success rate is minor in adversarial training. We
evaluate the adversarially trained models as shown
in Table 1 (rows with “Ours” for field “Training”).
After our adversarial training, the performance
of all the target models on adversarial examples
raises significantly, while that on the original ex-
amples remain comparable. The results demon-
strate that adversarial training with our adversar-
ial examples can significantly improve the robust-
ness we focus on without remarkably hurting the
performance on original data. Note that since the
focus of this paper is on model robustness which
can hardly be evaluted on original data, we do not
expect performance improvement and can allow a
small drop on original data as previous work (Jia
and Liang, 2017; Iyyer et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al.,
2018). Moreover, although our adversarial exam-
ple generation is constrained by a BERT language
model, BiMPM and DIIN which do not inherently
involve BERT can also significantly benefit from
adversarial training, further demonstrating the ef-
fectiveness of our method.
4.7 Comparison with Previous Work
Dataset Method Training Adv. AccuracyPos Neg All
QQP
TextFooler Normal 40.4 99.4 69.9Adv. 82.8 59.8 71.3
PAWS Normal 90.1 14.8 36.0Adv. 90.1 79.4 82.4
MRPC TextFooler Normal 28.0 100.0 64.0Adv. 59.6 72.4 66.0
Table 3: Accuracies (%) of normally trained models
and models adversarially trained (rows with “Adv.” for
field “Training”) with adversarial examples by previous
methods. The accuracies are evaluated on adversari-
ally modified examples by the corresponding previous
method rather than ours.
We quantitatively compare our method with pre-
vious methods for adversarial example generation.
We use BERT as the target model, and we compare
with the following representative previous work
that can be applied to adversarial example genera-
tion for paraphrase identification:
• TextFooler (Jin et al., 2019)4 aims to gen-
erate adversarial examples that are semanti-
cally equivalent to original sentences by re-
placing some words with their synonyms. We
fine-tune BERT with adversarial examples
generated by TextFooler in a similar manner
as our adversarial training.
• PAWS (Zhang et al., 2019b)5 is an adversar-
ial dataset of sentence pairs with high lexi-
cal overlap for paraphrase identification. It
was generated using word swapping and back
translation, and it also involved human in-
tervention. We use the part generated from
QQP and append it to the original training
data of QQP to fine-tune BERT. MRPC is not
involved.
Table 3 shows the performance of models on ex-
amples adversarially modified by previous work.
For TextFooler, normally trained models have
very high accuracy on negative examples (99.4%
and 100.0% for QQP and MRPC respectively),
indicating that TextFooler generally cannot suc-
cessfully generate negative adversarial examples
from original examples we sample. Thus we do
not use negative adversarial examples in adver-
sarial training for TextFooler, and randomly sam-
ple negative original examples from the dataset
as a substitution. After adversarial training with
TextFooler, models have significantly higher ac-
curacies on positive examples by TextFooler, but
they still have low accuracies on our adversarially
modified examples as shown in Table 1.
As for PAWS, both the normally trained and ad-
versarially trained models have high accuracies on
positive examples by PAWS (90.1%), indicating
that PAWS is ineffective for generating positive
adversarial examples. The normally trained model
has a low overall accuracy on examples by PAWS
because PAWS is not able to generate balanced ex-
amples from QQP (Zhang et al., 2019b) and there
are much more negative examples. After adversar-
ial training with PAWS, the model has a significant
4https://github.com/jind11/TextFooler
5https://github.com/google-research-datasets/paws
improvement on negative examples by PAWS, but
it still has a low accuracy on our adversarial exam-
ples.
In contrast to TextFooler and PAWS, our
method can effectively generate both positive and
negative adversarial examples. Results also show
that adversarial examples by previous work are in-
sufficient to make models robust to our adversarial
examples, which demonstrates that we discover a
new robustness issue and generate adversarial ex-
amples substantially different from those by pre-
vious work. Therefore, our method is valuable for
further improving model robustness beyond issues
studied by previous work.
We notice that models adversarially trained with
TextFooler has a drop on negative examples be-
cause negative adversarial examples are not in-
volved in training at this time. In future work, we
will try to improve the adversarial training with
TextFooler and better utilize negative examples.
Nevertheless, this does affect our claims and con-
tributions discussed in the previous paragraphs.
4.8 Effectiveness of Paired Common Words
Dataset Target Model Unpaired Paired
QQP
BiMPM 11.2 7.8
DIIN 26.2 8.2
BERT 76.4 14.8
MRPC
BiMPM 0.0 0.2
DIIN 2.4 0.4
BERT 23.0 2.0
Table 4: Accuracies of target models (%) on negative
adversarial examples generated without using paired
common words (unpaired), compared with those by our
full algorithm (paired). There is no comparison for pos-
itive adversarial examples due to the inapplicability of
the unpaired version.
We further analyse the necessity and effective-
ness of modifying sentences with paired common
words. We consider another version that replaces
one single word independently at each step with-
out using paired common words, namely the un-
paired version. First, for positive adversarial ex-
amples semantically different from original sen-
tences, the unpaired version is inapplicable, be-
cause the label can be easily broken if common
words from two sentences are replaced indepen-
dently. For the negative case, we study the ef-
fectiveness of the unpaired version. For fairness,
we allow a doubled step number limit for this ver-
sion. As shown in Table 4, the performance of
target models on negative examples generated by
the unpaired version, particularly that of BERT, is
mostly much higher than those by our full algo-
rithm, except for BiMPM on MRPC but its accu-
racies have almost reached 0 (0.0% for unpaired
and 0.2% for paired). Therefore, our algorithm us-
ing paired common words are more effective than
the unpaired version. Difficult common words
for negative examples tend to make target models
over-confident about common words and distract
the models on recognizing the semantic difference
in the unmodified part. Our algorithm explicitly
utilizes this property and thus can well reveal such
a robustness issue.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm to gen-
erate both positive and negative adversarial exam-
ples for paraphrase identification, by adversarially
modifying original examples with difficult com-
mon words. Our adversarial examples can also be
semantically different from original sentences and
the unmodified part of each pair of sentences is
diverse, and thereby they reveal a new robustness
issue. The accuracies of the target models drop
dramatically on our adversarially modified exam-
ples, while human annotators are much less af-
fected and the modified sentences retain a good
language quality. We also show that model ro-
bustness can be improved using adversarial train-
ing with our adversarial examples. Our adversar-
ial examples are valuable for improving model ro-
bustness beyond the scope of previous work, and
they can foster future research for further improv-
ing model robustness.
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Sentences Label Model Output
(P) How can I lose weight at age 55 ? Matched Matched→ Unmatched
(Q) What are some ways to lose weight fast ?
(P’) How can I buy anything at age 55 ?
(Q’) What are some ways to buy anything fast ?
(P) If infinite dark/vacuum/gravitational energy can be created
as universe expands , does it mean that their potentiality or
potential energy is infinite ?
Unmatched Unmatched→Matched
(Q) What are good gifts for a foreign visitor to bring when they ’re
invited to someone ’s home in Vietnam for the first time ?
(P’) If local global interactions can be created as universe expands
, does it mean that their existence or potential plane is infinite
?
(Q’) What are global interactions for a local visitor to bring when
they ’re invited to someone ’s plane in existence for the first
time ?
Table 5: Typical adversarial examples generated using BERT as the target model on QQP. “(P)” and “(Q)” in-
dicate original sentences, and “(P’)” and “(Q’)” indicate adversarially modified sentences. Modified words are
highlighted in bold.
Sentences Label Model Output
(P) The spacecraft is scheduled to blast off as early as tomorrow
or as late as Friday from the Jiuquan launching site in the Gobi
Desert .
Matched Matched→ Unmatched
(Q) The spacecraft is scheduled to blast off between next Wednes-
day and Friday from a launching site in the Gobi Desert .
(P’) The match is scheduled to kick off as early as tomorrow or as
late as Friday from the Jiuquan long day in the hot summer .
(Q’) The match is scheduled to kick off between next Wednesday
and Friday from a long day in the hot summer .
(P) The resolution was approved with no debate by delegates at
the bar association ’s annual meeting here .
Unmatched Unmatched→Matched
(Q) Morales , who pleaded guilty in July , expressed “ sincere regret
and remorse ” for his crimes .
(P’) The loss was approved with no surprise by delegates at the bar
association ’s annual meeting here .
(Q’) Morales , who pleaded guilty in July , expressed “ sincere regret
and surprise ” for his loss .
Table 6: Typical adversarial examples generated using BERT as the target model on MRPC.
